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Independence of the judge civlist in the context of legal stability  
 
“The judgements ought to be fixed to such a degree as to be 
ever conformable to the letter of the law (…), and judges are 
no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, 
mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force 
or rigour (…), and of the three powers, the judiciary is in some 
measure next to nothing.” 





The purpose of this article is to examine the relation between legal stability, in 
particular, its manifestation in a form of uniformity of jurisprudence, and the internal 
independence of a judge.  
I would like to form the following hypotheses: 
1. The term “judicial independence” is complex and consists of two 
components – an external independence – guaranteed institutionally – and 
internal independence – guaranteed by the rules of ethics.  
2. The internal independence might be considered as the “independence 
from…” and the “freedom to…” The space of the “independence from” 
contains the freedom from being pressured and influenced, freedom from 
own preferences, arbitrariness, emotions, ignorance, and unawareness. The 
space of the “freedom to” contains, in particular, an intellectual openness of 
a judge.  
3. The internal independence affects decisions of a judge on the choice of 
factors to be considered while adjudicating, and thus influences the way a 
judge participates in establishing legal stability, in one of its aspects – 
namely – in establishing the uniformity of jurisprudence.  
4. Court judicature has been designed to be a self-controlling system. Internal 
independence of a judge shall be one of the factors legitimizing self-control 
of the system.  
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Legal Stability in the Context of the Court Adjudication  
 
The terms “stability,” “consistency,” and “uniformity” belong to the category of 
designations describing similar phenomena. Therefore, it is not surprising that legal 
stability occurs with consistency of legal provisions and uniformity of jurisprudence. 
Restrictive understanding of consistency of legal provisions does not guarantee legal 
certainty, because their consistency – towards changeability of the world and society – 
may lead to their i r r e l e v a n c e , understood as the situation in which law does not 
match to the current social, economic, or technical situation. One should note however, 
that the uniformity of jurisprudence is also not a simple consequence of consistency of 
the legal provisions. The approach of Montesquieu, which became a deceitful motto of 
this article, is not up-to-date anymore. The perspective on judicial power has evolved. 
The judges, indeed, are subject solely to the Constitution and statuses.1 However, 
between the Constitution, acts, and a judicial decision there is also an a s s e s s m e n t . If 
there was no assessment involved, it would be difficult to categorize judiciary as the 
power. “The notion of ‘power’ itself implies making a choice between the options and 
different judgements. If a decision-making process does not allow certain leeway, or if 
allowed leeway is minimal, (…) it is hard to (…) reasonably conclude that the decision-
making individual holds any power, but is, at the most, an executioner of the decisions 
taken by the ultimate decision-maker.”2 The concept of the division of powers is based, 
inter alia, on the assumption that different bodies conduct an assessment on different 
levels. The level of enacting legislation involves the assessment of general and 
abstractive cases performed by the legislator. The significant element at the level of 
application of law is constituted by courts’ assessments of individual cases. Courts 
interpret the Constitution and statuses by passing individual judgments. Without the 
process of making assessments, the judicial power would be – per Montesquieu’s words 
– “next to nothing.” When asked about the role played in judicature, the judge replies: 
  
I am a great opponent of the formula that a judge is only the mouth that speaks the words of the 
law. I believe that the above concept is an aberration. Administration of justice consists of 
passing the judgment under which one may place their own signature and it does not involve 
                                                          
1 “Judges, within the exercise of their office, shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution and 
statutes.” “The Constitution of the Republic of Poland.” Art. 178 Sec. 1.  
2 Sanetra, Walerian. Sądy powszechne i Sąd Najwyższy jako władza sądownicza. “Przegląd sądowy,” 
2008, No. 6, p. 6; cf. also Wróblewski, Jerzy. Sądowe stosowanie prawa. Warszawa, 1972, p. 382: “The 




automatic application of the legislator’s decisions. If we proceeded in that way, then we would 
not need the judges but judgment passing devices only.3 
If the a s s e s s m e n t  stands between the Constitution, an act, and the judgment, 
one should also note the existence of at least two competing models of application of 
law – the syllogistic and argumentation-based one. The significant factor in syllogistic 
model of application of law (much simplified) is that a judicial decision is an 
automatically determined consequence inferred from the facts of the case and a 
provision.4 It is a model example of a theory of mandatory decision, according to which, 
application of law consists of “execution” or “exact application” of statutes.5 The 
argumentation-based model of application of law relies on a decision-making individual 
choosing between alternative decisions while taking into consideration several criteria 
(for example criterion of achieving the reconstructed aim of the provisions).6 This 
model is included in the theory of discretionary decision of application of law. 
Occasionally, it may also be considered as a border case as, from one hand, it is based 
on the process of drawing logical conclusions from the adopted assumptions, and, from 
the other hand, the process of justifying interpretational decisions is not solely of logical 
nature.7 
The argumentation-based model is related to judicial activism. “Judicial activism 
is implied when a judge makes their own decision while adjudicating the dispute, in 
other words, when a judge makes the decision that is not determined or is not entirely 
determined by binding provisions of law.”8 The dispute whether judicial power should 
                                                          
3 An Interview No. 23, the Judge of the Local Court. Quoted statements of judges come from the 
interviews conducted within a scope of the research project, Competences of judges to make decisions as 
the condition of effectiveness of judiciary in civil cases, led by the author. The author conducted quality 
studies that involved conducting partially categorised interviews. Unlike free-form interviews, the 
partially categorised interviews imply asking questions prepared in advance and not conducting the 
unstructured conversation around the directives determined according to the field of study. Unlike 
categorised interviews, the partially categorized interviews allow changing the order of questions and 
adjusting the course of conversation to the interlocutor e.g. by skipping the questions answered by the 
interviewee as a comment to another question. The interviews focused on receiving answers within pre-
defined categories of subjects. The project was carried out in the time of July 2013-December 2015 in 
Krakow Local Courts (civil departments) and Regional Court (civil, economic, civil appellate, economic 
appellate, and inspection departments). In total the project covered interviews with 100 judges. Further 
reference to interviews shall occur in the format of: “An Interview No. XY, the Judge of Local Court/the 
Judge of Regional Court.” 
4 Cf. Morawski, Lech. Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa. Prawo w toku przemian. 
Warszawa, 2005, p. 201. 
5 Cf. Sarkowicz, Ryszard; Stelmach, Jerzy. Teoria prawa. Kraków, 2001, p. 97. 
6 Cf. Morawski. Główne problemy… op. cit., p. 201–202. 
7 Cf. Sarkowicz, Stelmach. op. cit., p. 103. 
8 Morawski, Lech. Kilka uwag w sprawie sędziowskiego aktywizmu. [in:] Staśkiewicz, Wieław; Stawecki, 
Tomasz. Dyskrecjonalność w prawie. Warszawa, 2010. published on: www.proinfo.pl, under the link:  
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possess a quality of judicial activism or passivism has been conducted for some time 
already and there are several arguments for and against both thesis. I do not consider as 
necessary for my analysis to enlist all such arguments and all the past discussions 
involving the topic. My position is based on the presumption that judicial activism has 
become a fact.9 Lech Morawski – referring to Jürgen Habermas – distinctly emphasises 
the irreversibility of existence of judicial activism:  
   
To paraphrase Habermas - we could state that due to its linguistic properties - law is an 
unfinished project in each moment of its very existence and this is a main reason for courts to be 
condemned to activism. I would like to firmly emphasise that courts are condemned to activism 
even against their own will.10  
In such a case, it is necessary to consider the above fact while analysing the 
matter of stability of law in the form of uniformity of jurisprudence in relation to 
internal independence of a judge. Secondly, there is also a non-legal argument 
supporting the necessity of existence of judicial activism. Possibly, the argument is not 
related to philosophical and legal dispute on the necessity of existence of judicial 
activism and a competing concept of judicial passivism, but it is of primary importance 
for the conclusion of the discussion. It is related to the fact which is as vaguely 
associated with disputes on philosophy of law as the Newton's law of universal 
gravitation is. The above indicated fact is the matter of open texture of language, as 
presented in L.A. Hart’s thesis on the matter of semantic indeterminacy of law.  
I fully agree that semantic open texture of law may be the factor determining the 
choice of the model of application of law. It does not only imply the choice made by 
theoreticians and philosophers of law, but also by the judges themselves due to the 
surrounding circumstances.  
A sphere of semantic uncertainty shall be the sphere, where the decision whether the facts of the 
case match the term of the legal text or not is made based on the arguments. Applying the 
terminology of J. Wróblewski, we could state that open terms are always related to discretionary 
power,11 which needs argumentative reasoning to be filled out, which reasoning requires analysis 
of all arguments that would be for and against applying the rules embodied in the legal text to 
certain facts of the case.12 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.aplikanci.profinfo.pl/gfx/lexisnexis/userfiles/files/kilka_uwag_w_sprawie_sedziowskiego_akt
ywizmu.pdf, p. 2. 
9 Cf. Morawski. Kilka uwag… op. cit., p. 1.  
10 Ibidem. 
11 Wróblewski, Jerzy. Sądowe stosowanie prawa. Warszawa, 1988, p. 240. 
12 Morawski. Główne problemy… op. cit., p. 204. 
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  In my opinion – leaving the system-wide role of courts in the institution of the 
state behind at the time – openness and properties of natural language, in which legal 
articles are formed, enforces the application of argumentation-based model of 
application of law. Therefore, either way it places a judgement of the judge – as a 
decision-maker – at the heart of judge’s activity13 and, consequently, it makes the 
reasoning skills one of the key competences of a judge. 
If one recognizes a function of a court within the legal order, then one must 
admit that the tripartite separation of powers bears a lot functions now.14 Traditionally, 
it was established to limit any distinct branch of power from exercising the core 
functions of another. However, it also involves cooperation of the powers and their 
complementarity. The role of a court evolves because the legislative inflation 
increases,15 and, at the same time, the legislator does not keep up with the dynamics of 
the social changes. A significant aspect of the process described above is also the fact 
that the Constitution lists the rights based on certain values. Courts are forced to settle 
disputes related to the clash between different values enlisted in the Constitution.  
In a public debate about values, a common strategy is to assume that when one has proved that 
two values conflict in some circumstances, and one is more important than the other, a problem 
has been settled. But that is, in fact, rarely the case.
16 
Very often it is not the judgment on which value is “more important,” but rather 
the judgement on which value, in a specific case, deserves a stronger protection. It may 
turn out that both values shall be protected in a specific case and one needs to determine 
the proportion of the protection. It is a necessary activity of a court since such an 
activity is subjected to the Constitution and acts. The function of a court requiring 
“decoding” legal norms from legal articles17 and not simply “performing the content of 
statutes” also justifies judicial activism.18  
Uniformity of jurisprudence is a factor that co-shapes legal certainty. On the one 
hand, judicial independence constitutes one of the guaranties of the rule of law. If one of 
                                                          
13 The subject of legal reasoning – cf. e.g. Oniszczuk, Jerzy. Koncepcje argumentacji prawniczej i 
działania komunikacyjnego [in:] Oniszczuk, Jerzy. Filozofia i teoria prawa. Warszawa, 2012, p. 601–641. 
14 Cf. Łętowska, Ewa; Łętowski, Janusz. Co wynika dla sądów z konstytucyjnej zasady podziału władz. 
[in:] Konstytucja i gwarancje jej przestrzegania. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci prof. Janiny Zakrzewskiej. 
eds. Trzciński, Janusz; Jankiewicz, Adam. Warszawa, 1996, p. 383–387. 
15 Cf. Smolak, Marek. Uzasadnienie sądowe jako argument z moralności politycznej. Kraków, 2003,  
p. 25. 
16 Brighouse, Harry. Sprawiedliwość. Warszawa, 2007, p. 13. 
17 Cf. Izdebski, Hubert. Fundamenty współczesnych państw. Warszawa, 2007, s. 230. 
18 Cf. Morawski, Główne problemy…, op. cit., p. 197–199. 
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the crucial elements of a judicial decision is a judgment and judicial independence is 
composed, inter alia, of directives that a judge should follow in a decision-making 
process, then it is necessary to state a question on how the uniformity of jurisprudence 
of independence judges – should be assured.  
 
Mechanisms of Assurance of Uniformity of Jurisprudence  
 
What can stand in the way of uniformity of jurisprudence? Firstly, mistakes of 
individuals issuing judgements and, secondly, discrepancies in j u s t i f i a b l e  
judgements. By the term “justifiable” I mean non-arbitrary decisions based on 
argumentation expressed in the reasons for the judgement which may be accepted 
within the adopted value system and reference points.  
In this context mistakes shall mean the result of blameable negligence – 
ignorance or lack of diligence in application of law, whereas discrepancies within the 
justifiable judgement are the regular outcome of decision-making process. Mistakes of 
judges may corrected to a variable extent – by a way of reproach for default, penalties 
applied within disciplinary proceedings, or judgements on complaint about finding 
illegality of the valid judgment. The discrepancies in the field of justifiable judgements 
may be removed with the use of instruments available for the Supreme Court and – in a 
fragmentary way – also by instance control.  
In a case of a mistake, when there is an “obvious violation of the provisions of 
law” or a “gross violation of the provisions of law,” a reproach for default19 or 
disciplinary sanction is applied.20 
Institution of reproach for default consists in a regional court acting as an 
appellate court or a court of appeal itself, or the Supreme Court (respectively to the 
stage of the proceedings) making a reproach for default to a relevant court in a case of a 
g r o s s  violation of provisions of law determined while hearing of the case. This is an 
out-of-court and an extrajudicial supervision measure. It is of preventive nature as being 
designed to prevent passing incorrect judgements. In fact, a decision of the court related 
to a reproach for default is not attached to the case being subject of an original 
                                                          
19 Art. 40 of the Act of July 27, 2001 – Law on Common Courts Organisation, Journal of Laws 2001, 
No. 99, item. 1070, as amended; and Art. 65 of the Act of November 23, 2002 on the Supreme Court, 
Journal of Laws 2002, No. 240, item. 2052, as amended (further referred to as the Act on Supreme 
Court). 
20 Art. 107 § 1 of Law on Common Courts Organisation.  
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adjudication and the determination and notification of a breach of law itself also does 
not affect the initial case. However, it does potentially affect diligence of future 
proceedings. It is related inter alia to the fact that a reproach for default affects 
professional career of a judge as a consequence of judges’ breach of professional duties. 
However, it is a court – and not a judge – that is the direct addressee of a reproach for 
default. The reproach for default does not concern interpretation, judgements, or points 
of view, but it does concern the basic professionalism in the legal field. It expresses 
legislator’s awareness that there is a need to draw the line between freedom of 
adjudication based on judgment independence and “freedom of adjudication” based on 
lack of diligence and ignorance. Judges indicate that reproach for default is an 
instrument used rarely as it concerns only gross manifestations of lack of diligence of a 
judge: “That happens rarely and these are extreme cases like significant delay or 
preposterous judgment.”21 “I have seen a reproach for default only once. The 
proceedings were conducted by a local court instead of regional court and people 
involved wasted two years of their lives.”22 
A second type of liability for mistakes in the form of “apparent and blatant 
breach of law” is constituted by disciplinary responsibility.23 Disciplinary responsibility 
provides sanctions such as an admonition, reprimand, dismissal form the function held, 
transfer to another place of service, and dismissal from the office.24 Some of those 
sanctions are related to restrictions in promotions and other prerogatives of a judge for a 
certain period calculated from the time when the decision has been issued.25 
Disciplinary liability – similarly to a reproach for default – is related to mistakes and not 
different assessment of the case. Therefore, the fact of a judgement being amended or 
quashed by the court of higher instance does not constitute the reason for instigating 
disciplinary proceedings as much as it does not constitute the reason for applying the 
institution of a reproach for default.26 Amending or quashing judgements is a result of 
the fact that the assessment of the matter may vary.  
Mistakes in judgements shall be removed and prevented while discrepancies in 
justifiable judgements are natural elements of the system of application of law. The aim 
                                                          
21 An Interview No. 33, the Judge of Regional Court. 
22 An Interview No. 1, the Judge of Regional Court. 
23 Art. 107 § 1 of Law on Common Courts Organisation. 
24 Art. 109 § 1 of Law on Common Courts Organisation 
25 Art. 109 § 3 and 4 of Law on Common Courts Organisation. 
26 Resolution of the Supreme Court of November 28, 2000, SD 16/00 quoted by: Musioł, Józef. Uwagi na 
marginesie dyskusji o niezawisłości sędziowskiej w państwie prawa. „Krajowa rada Sądownictwa” 2008, 
No. 1, p. 58. 
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should not be to eliminate this element but only particular discrepancies when there are 
premises to do so. The Supreme Court has at its disposal the specialized instruments to 
remove discrepancies that result from a certain manner of administration of justice held 
by that court. The Supreme Court holds the administration of justice by inter alia 
ensuring the compliance of the rulings with law and its uniformity. In the case that 
jurisprudence of common courts or the Supreme Court itself reveals discrepancies in the 
interpretation of law, then the First President of the Supreme Court27 may submit 
motion to settle such a legal issue to the relevant panel of the Court. If the bench of 
seven Justices finds it justified from the point of view of the court practice or the gravity 
of the doubts, it may submit the question of law or a request for the adoption of a 
resolution to a bench of a chamber, while the chamber may submit them to a bench of 
two or more chambers, or to the entire Supreme Court bench.28 Upon their adoption, the 
resolutions of the entire Supreme Court bench, a bench of joint chambers, or a bench of 
the entire chamber shall become legal principles, and resolutions of a bench of seven 
Justices may gain such status on the basis of a decision. At the same time, legal 
principles are not changeable. If any Supreme Court bench intends to depart from a 
legal principle, it shall submit the resulting question of law for adjudication to a bench 
of the entire chamber.29 
Judicial control may also act as a factor unifying judicature. Such unification 
however, is a fragmentary one – within the relevant appeal area and within the limits of 
an appellate measure by grievance or appeal. The judge of a Regional Court Appeal 
Division presents the role of a court of second instance in the following way:  
Specificity of adjudicating a case in the court of appeal causes the court to analyse the case to 
evaluate potential appeal allegations. We - in courts of appeal - do not adjudicate cases in the 
same way we do in the courts of first instance, where a judge is given case files and decides 
about the direction of the evidentiary hearing. The role of the court of appeal is, as a matter of 
fact, limited to the assessment if a proceeding conducted in the court of the first instance was 
correct and, additionally, is restricted to the limits of appeal allegations.30 
                                                          
27 And some other parties in the scope of their properties, cf. art. 60 § 2 of Law on Common Courts 
Organisation. 
28 Art. 61 § 2 of the Act on Supreme Court. 
29 Departing from a legal principle adopted by a chamber, joint chambers, or the entire Supreme Court 
bench requires re-settlement in the form of resolution respectively by a proper chamber, joint chambers, 
or the entire Supreme Court bench and, if it is one of the chambers of the Supreme Court that wants to 
depart from a legal principle adopted by another chamber, the conclusion shall be reached by the 
resolution of both chambers. Art. 62 of the Act on Supreme Court. 
30 An Interview No. 85, the Judge of Regional Court. 
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I have presented basic31 mechanisms of assuring uniformity of jurisprudence 
leading to elimination of mistakes and removal of discrepancies (irregularities) in the 
field of justifiable judgments. Making mistakes while adjudicating cases is not included 
in the notion of judge independence, because it is a result of a lack of professionalism or 
a blunder. Making different assessments, however, lays in the scope of the judicial 
independence, because it pertains to independence in the field of making free 
assessment. Therefore, the further part of this article will focus on the relation between 
judicial independence and uniformity of jurisprudence provided by the mechanisms of 
removal of discrepancies (irregularities) in justifiable judgments.  
  
What is Independence? 
 
Giving an answer to the question on the nature of the relation between 
“centralized” unification of jurisprudence conducted by the Supreme Court and the 
principle of judicial independence requires determining what actually judicial 
independence is. In fact, there are two kinds of independence: external independence 
with its external guarantees determined in the Constitution and a status, and internal 
independence with guarantees being anchored in personality of individual judges. 
Except for “freedom from pressure and influence” which has both internal and external 
dimension, all elements of judicial independence analysed in this article belong to the 
sphere of internal independence. Andrzej Rzepliński qualifies internal integrity, 
honesty, and courage32 as internal guarantees of independence. I focused on the above, 
because there is a tendency to “fetishize institutional mechanisms guaranteeing 
independence and to diminish cultural and behavioural factors,”33 while “sole 
constitutional guarantee of judicial independence is not directly translated into 
independent actions of individual judge.”34 One may even dare to claim that 
independence may function even without external guarantees.  
                                                          
31 The word “basic” is used in the sense of “institutional” here, as there are other mechanisms of assuring 
uniformity of jurisprudence, being governed by other rules – as voting on judgement and legal literature. 
32 Rzepiński, Andrzej. Niezależność sędziowska jako gwarant konstytucyjnych prawo i wolności. [in:] 
Niezależność sądownictwa i zawodów prawniczych jako fundamenty państwa prawa. Wyzwania 
współczesności. eds. Wardyński, Tomasz;  Niziołek, Magdalena. Warszawa, 2009, p. 80. 
33 Franklin, Charles H. Behavioral factors affecting judical independence. [in:] Judicial independence at 
the crossroads: An Interdisciplinary approach, eds. Burbank, Stephen B., Friedman, Barry. Londyn, 
2002, p. 149–152, as cited in Skrzypiński, Dariusz. Władza sądownicza w procesie transformacji 
polskiego systemu politycznego. Studium politologiczne. Wrocław, 2009, p. 57. 
34 Tokarczyk, Roman. Etyka prawnicza. Warszawa, 2011, p. 136. 
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It may be a result of adequately high culture of practising a profession – with imprinted 
readiness to deflect all kinds of the non-legal pressure, and sense of responsibility in judges who 
understand the mission and character of their office, and also social climate, where any attempt 
to affect judges is negatively perceived by the public opinion and media that have a firm belief 
that courts perform their role in an independent manner. Such an evaluation is also supported by 
the readiness of judicial community to remove individuals unable to perform the office in a 
manner that would comply with such high standards.35 
In my opinion, judicial independence may be considered as “independence 
from…” and “freedom to…” The area of the “independence from” includes: 
a) freedom from being pressured and influenced; 
b) freedom from own preferences and arbitrariness (unjustifiability) of decisions; 
c) freedom from emotions – to certain extent; 
d) freedom from ignorance (lack of knowledge).  
And the area of “freedom to” includes particular intellectual openness of a judge.  
 
Freedom from Being Pressured and Influenced 
 
There is a difference between a “pressure” and “influence.” Pressure is related to 
activities of the parties, participants of proceedings, media, public opinion, other 
authorities, and representatives of the judicial power itself. But activities of all those 
subjects do not have to and, most probably, do not translate into an attempt to bribe a 
judge to set forth the shape the adjudication of the specific case. Such pressure is 
relatively easy to identify and thus – easy to avoid. Much harder to identify and to avoid 
are “traps of influence” which are not so direct and, most often, are psychologically 
conditioned. For example, a risk occurs when a judge is delegated to adjudicate in a 
court of higher instance. A judge may be potentially, even subconsciously, oriented 
opportunistically fearing to be assessed by other members of the panel – as it may be 
afterwards related to making the appointment of a candidate to be nominated for a 
higher judge position.36  
Influence of media on a judge, for example, may translate into situation when 
tired or less attentive judge starts considering arguments presented in media before 
formulating and analyses their own ones.  
                                                          
35 Skrzypiński, op. cit. p. 118. 
36 Cf. Gonera, Katarzyna. Niezależność i niezawisłość sędziowska jako podstawa państwa prawa. 
Wewnętrzna (intelektualna) niezależność sędziego. [in:] Niezależność sądownictwa i zawodów 
prawniczych..., op. cit., p. 95. 
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Social sensitivity may also be a potential tool used for influencing a judge, as 
there is a temptation to consider and employ reasons significant from a social 
perspective, not relevant however in the light of law, for the final shape of ruling. I 
would like to use very expressive way of showing such influence and conflict related to 
it that is captured impressionistically in the novel:  
Children asked for money for parents, mothers for children, men asked for money for 
everything. (…) For clothing. For soup. For mother. For transplant. You passed by, you could 
not pass by. Without heart. (…) Pens for kidneys. Stamps for liver. Pasty Romanian females 
exchanged sleeping children for puppies. There was a time when children warmed up hearts and 
now dogs warm them up.37  
However, a judge does not adjudicate based on sole sense of justice but on 
provisions applied in compliance w i t h  t h e  s e n s e  o f  j u s t i c e  –  that is within the 
specified limits e.g. limits of general clauses. Not all individual circumstances may 
affect adjudication of a case in a justifiable manner, unless these circumstances are set 
forth by law or may be placed within the application of general clauses.38 Within the 
framework of judicial independence understood as “independence from…” a judge 
should be free from both pressure and, which is more difficult, from influence. 
 
Freedom from Own Preferences 
 
The demand of “freedom from own preferences” cast some doubts of 
psychological nature. Acting against own preferences may lead to cognitive dissonance. 
Thus, in turn, requires taking some actions to reduce the cognitive dissonance that might 
have negative consequences for a judge as a human being and for a judge – as a judge.  
Cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs when a person holds two cognitions (ideas, 
attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent. Stated differently, two 
cognitions are dissonant if, when considered alone, the opposite of one follows from the other. 
Because the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people are motivated to reduce 
it.39 
                                                          
37 Strumyk, Grzegorz. Pigment. Wałbrzych, 2002, p. 17. 
38 “Adjudication solely on the basis of law shall be weighed against the judgment based on other grounds, 
even if objectively legitimate, e.g. on the basis of criteria of expediency or effectiveness.” Ereciński, 
Tadeusz; Gudowski, Jacek; Iwulski, Józef. Komentarz do prawa o ustroju sądów powszechnych i ustawy  
krajowej radzie sądownictwa. Warszawa, 2002, p. 14 (from foreword). 
39 Aronson, Elliot. Człowiek istota społeczna. Warszawa, 2005, p. 171. Leon Festinger is considered as an 
author of cognitive dissonance theory, cf. Festiger, Leon. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, CA, 1957. 
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  The source of cognitive dissonance may be the fact that judges have certain 
convictions and believe that, acting in accordance with the conscience, they should 
make judgements according to them. Yet a judge adjudicates otherwise to meet the 
demand of “independence from one’s own preferences” and follows the voices of the 
majority that has different opinion on the matter that a judge. Such a situation would be 
obviously unwanted; therefore it is worth considering what it really means to be “free 
from one’s own preferences.” It occurs that it may have slightly different meaning that 
initially assumed.  
 “A judge should avoid the voluntaristic judgements, i.e. being based only on 
their own opinion, without taking into consideration different circumstances.”40 What 
does it mean in practice? It means that, while adjudicating, a judge shall take into 
account the cultural and civilizational factors of the case being judged.41 “The judges 
are also subject to the influence of the certain legal culture and ways of assessment 
adopted in their social environment, and only those elements, considered jointly, define 
the way of understanding the <act – A.D> that a judge, while adjudication, is subject 
to.”42 The Constitutional Tribunal pointed out that professional qualifications of a judge 
include not only the knowledge of law, but also, inter alia, knowledge of current social, 
economic, and political problems, social relations, as well as the established social 
customs and principles of social coexistence, and understanding of the concept of public 
or socio-economic interests as prerequisites of the functional interpretation of law.43 
 One may ask how a judge should act when society is divided on an issue. Is 
judge’s role to seek a compromise, align to the will of majority, or to make the own 
judgement with detachment from social opinions? In this case it is necessary to allow a 
judge to make the judgement, since there is no universality of assessments and the total 
objectification of opinions is not possible.44 One can only try to get as close as possible 
to the objective model.45 
 The question on the extent to which a judge can afford the “luxury of their own 
opinion” might be answered that: 
                                                          
40 Gonera, op. cit. p. 90. 
41 Cf. Gonera, op. cit. p. 90. 
42 Ziembiński, Zygmunt. O pojmowaniu sprawiedliwości. Lublin, 1992 r., p. 127-128. 
43 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on October 24, 2017, according to Bogdan Bladowski [in:] 
Bladowski, Bogdan. Metodyka pracy sędziego cywilisty. p. 40. 
44 Cf. Rott-Pietrzyk, op. cit. p. 291 and a footnote, No 95. 
45 Ibidem, p. 291. 
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The idea is (…) that judges’ opinions should not affect the judicial activity (…), although, (…) 
in the, so-called, difficult cases a judge can decide between the specified values (…) but in the 
objective manner – by referring to the current constitutional order or the social situation and 
according to the defined procedure.46 
 Judges adjudicate “according to their knowledge and own inner conviction.”47 
They also make a pledge to bring justice according to the rules of law and to t h e i r  
c o n s c i e n c e .48 
 One of the elements of making judgements is axiology. 
Quintessence of this is (...) the old anecdote about a judge who, considering a complaint against 
a woman pouring water into milk, imposed the lowest sentence possible within the scope of 
punishments. When asked on the application of the lowest sentence, the judge answered that he 
liked low-fat cheese. It is a human behaviour, but one may expect from a judge a sense of 
situation and not following someone’s inclination.49 
 In other words, judges shall rely on their believes, but not necessarily 
reflect their opinions in judgements. Isn’t the sentence contradictory? No, as… 
Every profession contains (…) elements of external necessity and requires dedication to tasks 
that are not selected for a personal purpose. (…) It means that one shall overcome something that 
is strange, presented by the profession as the peculiarity that one is, and the strange something 
makes a profession to be fully “own.” And so, devoting oneself to the generality of the 
profession requires so that one can confine oneself; it means to make one's profession entirely 
own business. Then it does not limit a man.50  
 The legislator indirectly obliges the decision-making individual to use the 
opinions. In the provisions it applies general clauses that encourage judges to make their 
assessments, these being determined by “socio-political and cultural factors and 
personality of a judge.”51 At the same time,  
“considering moral pluralism and a fact that a judge does not conduct any research and does not 
have the studies on values being acceptable by the society, a judge needs to rely on their own 
                                                          
46 Daniel, Krystyna. Normatywny i społeczny obraz sędziego. [in:] Sądy w opinii społeczeństwa polskiego. 
eds. Borucka-Arctowa, Maria, Pałecki, Krzysztof. Kraków, 2003, p. 123.  
47 Bladowski, Bogdan. Metodyka pracy sędziego cywilisty. Warszawa, 2008, p. 28. 
48 Art. 66 of Law on Common Courts Organisation and Art. 27 of the Act on Supreme Court. 
49 Łętowska, Ewa. Rzeźbienie państwa prawa 20 lat później, in a conversation with Krzysztof Sobczak, 
Lex Wolters Kluwer business, p. 60. 
50 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Prawda i metoda. Warszawa, 2013, p. 40. 
51 Wróblewski, Sądowe…, op. cit., p. 28. 
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perception of the social values. A judge is being legitimized to do so by a provision that obliges 
a judge to make decisions according to their own reason and life experience”.52 
 Freedom from voluntarism and one’s own preferences relates, in a sense, to 
objectivity – without excluding fidelity to subjectivity in terms of experience and 
conscience. I would like to emphasise that it is about the “objectivity in a sense.” 
Objectivity results from o n e ’ s  o w n  c o n v i c t i o n  about something being objective, 
and, at the same time, it s e p a r a t e s  i t s e l f  f r o m  o w n  o p i n i o n s  on various 
issues.  
 
Freedom from arbitrariness 
 
 Freedom from arbitrariness is closely related to freedom from voluntarism. 
Whereas voluntarism relates to criteria which a judge refers to while making decision, 
arbitrariness is about the ability to justify the decision taken. Thus, freedom from 
arbitrariness is not about specific sources of the decision, but rather if the decision can 
be justified or not. Instruments of protection against arbitrariness include inter alia 
openness of court proceedings, the obligation to provide reasons for a judgement, and 
judicial control.53 Courts shall explain the course of interpretative process54 and the 
matter of interpretation of law. 55 
With regard to the freedom, one shall pay particular attention to the reasons for 
judgements. Reasons for judgement has several functions. The first one is to legitimize 
the judgement.56 Judicial power proves that the case has been examined. The second 
function of the reason for judgement is explanation57 and persuasion of the people 
involved.58 It shall facilitate the acceptance of the judgement.59 “By reason for 
judgement, court’s decision will be presented as rational act – based on established 
norms of the law in force, on findings on facts adopted on the basis of certain evidence, 
                                                          
52 Cf. Rott-Pietrzyk, op. cit. p. 289.  
53 Cf. Rott-Pietrzyk, op. cit., p. 290. 
54 Ibid. Footnote No. 142. 
55Bladowski, op. cit., p. 30. 
56 Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal from April 11, 2005, SK 48/04, OTK-A-2005, No. 4, item. 
45. 
57 Cf. Ibidem. 
58 Cf. Wróblewski, Sądowe…, op. cit., p. 106–108; Włodyka, Stanisław, gloss to the resolution of a bench 
of seven Justices of Supreme Court from September 25, 1967, III CZP 117/66, OSPiKA 1968 C 195, p. 
413.  
59 Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on April 11, 2015, SK 48/04, Z.U. 2005 / 4A / 45. 
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on interpretative argumentation.” 60 It is not the judgement that shall be approved but the 
reasons for judgement. A judge shall not only adjudicate but also be willing and able to 
convince others.61 The third function of the reason for judgement is to allow verifiability 
of the methods used to make a decision and its control.62 In other words, a reason for 
judgement ensures verifiability of the decision. The fourth function of a reason for 
judgement is to shape the practice. The justified decision favours the predictability of 
future decisions.63 All of these functions can be united in a one word that determines the 
purpose of the reason for judgement. This word is “explanation.” Explanation is an 
inverse of arbitrariness of a decision and that is why “freedom from arbitrariness” is 
manifested primarily in the substantive (but also technical) quality of the reason for 
judgement. 
 
Freedom from emotions 
 
In the context of decision making process, one can say about freedom from 
emotions only to a certain extent. It is due to the fact that psychological studies show 
that damage to a centre of brain responsible for emotions makes it impossible to take 
any decisions.64 So one cannot eliminate emotions from the decision making process. It 
is rather about the ability to control emotions that are responsible for following 
impressions and superficial judgements or for interfering the stability of behaviour. In 
other words, emotions make it possible to form judgements, but it does not imply that 
they can be the reasons for judges’ future decisions.  
At this point I would like to refer to a controversial problem – routine. The word 
is commonly used in a pejorative sense, but, in the light of a judge being expected not to 
be driven by emotions, it is worth to analyse what routine is and what its purpose is. I 
am going to use an analogy. In chess, although there are countless combinations of 
                                                          
60 Wróblewski, Sądowe…, op. cit., p. 21; cf. referred R.A. Leflar, Some Observations concerning Judicial 
Opinions, “Columbia Law Review”, t. 61, 1961, p. 813 and following. 
61 Cf. Łętowska, Rzeźbienie państwa…, op. cit., p. 42–43. 
62 Cf. Piasecki, Kazimierz. Organizacja wymiaru sprawiedliwości w Polsce. Zakamycze, 2005, p. 65; cf. 
Wróblewski. Sądowe…, op. cit., p. 106–108; Włodyka, Stanisław, gloss to the resolution of a bench of 
seven Justices of Supreme Court from September 25, 1967, III CZP 117/66, OSPiKA 1968 C 195, p. 413 
PDZ; Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional tribunal from April 11, 2005, SK 48/04, OTK-A-2005, No. 4, 
item. 45. 
63 Cf. Wróblewski, Sądowe…, op. cit., s. 106–108; Włodyka, Stanisław, gloss to the resolution of a bench 
of seven Justices of Supreme Court from September 25, 1967, III CZP 117/66, OSPiKA 1968 C 195,  
p. 413. 
64 Cf. research described by A. Damasio in a book Błąd Kartezjusza, Poznań, 2002. 
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movements, one may notice some patters of pawns on the chess-board. To play well, a 
chess player considers the patters when deciding about the moves. Judges act similar to 
chess players thinking with chess diagrams – they think with categories of legal 
institutions. This does not prevent them to focus on a case that currently is being 
examined and that requires considering specific and individual circumstances.  
Routine is perceived pejoratively as it implies automatism in action and this, in 
turn, to the lack of individual approach. No one wishes to be treated as one of the many 
“cases.” However, professionalism is largely based on routine coming from experience. 
Individual approach and empathy arouses positive associations, but none of the 
reasonable people would claim they would like to be operated by a surgeon who is full 
of emotions. One might rather choose a surgeon with a cool head and steady hand being 
a result of routine. The apparent contradiction between an individual approach to a case 
and professionalism resulting from finding a pattern in a case may be illustrated by a 
sentence of Edouard Manet on the same apparent contradictions in painting: “Every new 
painting is like throwing myself into the water without knowing how to swim.” 65 
 
Freedom from ignorance and lack of knowledge (unawareness) 
  
Internal independence is related to the specific type of self-confidence – the one 
built on solid foundations.  
“The most solid ground for independence is (…) professionalism, deep knowledge, and 
high level of competence, rich life and professional experience of a judge. It is hard to 
influence experts with strong opinions, who know their value and are guided by the 
adapted principles.”66 
 Freedom of ignorance is mandatory in the field of independence of a judge.  
By neglecting self-education, not reading legal literature, not studying judgements of supreme 
courts, [a judge] risks that judging, understood as (…) making decisions or taking judgements, 
might start to be beyond their ability, (…) and, in this case, incompetence has some ethical 
connotations. Undertaking actions beyond one’s ability is unethical, as it may expose (…) those 
who are subject to judge’s adjudication to irreversible consequences in the area of rights being 
protected in court proceeding”.67 
                                                          
65 Manet, Edouard. Pędzlem i piórem. Kraków, 2010, Quotation No. 130. 
66 Gonera, op. cit., s. 96. 
67 Ibidem, s. 97–98. 
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Here the freedom from ignorance combines with the second area of independence that I 
would define as freedom “to.” 
 The ability to apply provisions to specific cases requires not only legal 
knowledge but also knowledge in the field of the case. General clauses and all elements 
of the system, opening law to reality, including culture, technology, knowledge on 
different scientific disciplines and areas of life, consider law as a social 
occurrence/event. Social realism of law prevent law from isolation. Law must be 
combined with knowledge in every area which the case being examined is related to. 
Therefore, an important characteristic of a lawyer, and a judge in particular, shall be the 
ability to acquire knowledge on facts – for the purpose of law enforcement. While 
observing the courtrooms, I have noticed that there are judges who take advantage of 
the presence of an architect, a doctor, or a nursery teacher in a hearing and try to find 
out more in their area of expertise.68 
 The method of a lawyer consists of an openness to finding out – that shall be 
distinguished from an openness to knowledge – and openness to question own 
knowledge. The latter element is necessary as people are not always aware that they 
“know that they know nothing” or that their beliefs are wrong. If judges based decisions 
only on the knowledge they believed they possess, they would not avoid mistakes. 
Questioning one’s own knowledge and falsifiability of statements might prevent them 
from making some mistakes.  
 Falsifiability of statements includes, in particular, the search for information. 
The fact that a judge has knowledge in a fled does not release a judge from examining the 
evidence from expert’s opinion (…) as it may deprive (…) parties of the possibility to ask 
questions and to criticise the given point of view. Judge’s own information can only facilitate the 
assessment of opinion on an expert.69 
 On the other hand, 
                                                          
68 It has an additional dimension – an expert talking about their matter of expertise becomes more relaxed 
and forgets about their role as a witness and, therefore, becomes more reliable. Some judges might have 
objections – even if it is a useful practice – there is not time for it. Especially when, in a department, there 
is pre-defined amount of cases being on a case-list. 
69 Ereciński, Tadeusz [in:] Erecińśki, Tadeusz; Gudowski, Jacek; Jędrzejewska, Maria. Komentarz do 




…courts are not bound by an opinion of an expert and shall assess it along with other evidence 
in the scope of discretionary evaluation of evidence. Uncritical acceptance of an opinion of an 
expert may lead to the possibility of an expert deciding on a case, not a judge.70  
 Judges’ knowledge allow them to evaluate opinions of experts.  
 Of course judges adjudicating in the wide scope of cases cannot be specialists in 
each matter. However, they need to understand the matter which law shall be applied to. 
In this specific professional situation, a judge shall manifest not so much the knowledge 
but an openness to finding out. It might be called inquisitiveness.  
 
Independence as a “freedom to…” 
 
The second area of independence is the one that I have already mentioned when 
considering the subject of “freedom from ignorance” – namely the area of freedom “to” 
– to think independently, to behave professionally in the decision making process, to 
internal integrity and to civil courage. A judge must be intellectually open.71 
Independence is a conscious choice to make one’s own individual, intellectual effort to establish 
facts, to find a relevant provision of law, and interpret it, considering all possible variants of 
interpretation, to decode a legal norm taking into consideration not only the content of the 
regulation, but also the axiology adopted.72 
 I would like to strongly emphasise the role of “openness to finding out.” To 
apply an abstract and general rule that is to translate it into a specific and individual one, 
one needs not only to have the good insight into facts but also possess knowledge that 
governs the facts. The importance of knowledge on facts related to the case requires a 
judge to establish a way to gather enough information on the subject being examined. 
Social realism of law does not allow law to isolate from other areas of knowledge. 
Therefore, it is an important element of the method of a judge to have the ability to 
gather knowledge on facts for the purpose of application of law. In my opinion this 
ability includes openness to finding out, being distinguished from the openness to 
                                                          
70 Ereciński, op. cit., p. 554 and quoted: Sehn, Jan. Dowód z opinii biegłych w postępowaniu sądowym. 
“Nowe prawo” 1956, No. 3; Ossowski, Waldemar. Uwagi o korzystaniu z biegłych w sprawach 
cywilnych. “Nowe prawo” 1960, No. 10; Włodyka, Stanisław. Zagadnienia dowodowe w nowym k.p.c. 
“Nowe prawo” 1966, No. 1; Rejman, Stanisław. Dowód z opinii biegłego w postępowaniu cywilnym. 
Warszawam 1967; Jaegermann, Kazimierz; Kłys, Stanisław. Rola biegłego w sądowym stosowaniu 
prawa. “Nowe prawo” 1989, No. 11–12. 
71 Gonera, op. cit., p. 93 Footnote no. 9. 
72 Ibidem, p. 91. 
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knowledge, and to questioning one’s own knowledge. The latter element is necessary as 
people are not always aware that they “know that they know nothing” or that their 
beliefs are wrong. If judges based only on the knowledge they believe they possess, they 
would not avoid mistakes”.73 
To summarise – internal independence is an intellectual attitude towards the 
position held74 and is the “fundamental ethic postulate for all judges.” 75 It is based on 
internal honesty and civil courage – that are being out-of-the-system boundaries of the 
independence.  
 
 And who will guard the guards themselves? – The relation between 
independence and control 
 
 “Sed quis custodiet et Ipsos custodes”76 – “and who will guard the guards 
themselves.”77 These words illustrate the dilemma: how to find the balance between 
independence of judges and the responsibility for the administration of justice. The very 
combination of “independence” and “control” raises concerns, not to mention finding 
the relation between them. Responsibility lies in the fact that there is a possibility of 
control in case in which law has been wrongly applied. The control is designed to be 
difficult because, if “law lives in the code,” 78 “a legal norm assumes a dispute over the 
content of the norm.” 79 Therefore, on the one hand, there must be a form of control not 
jeopardising the independence, and, on the other hand, the control must end with a final 
and legally binging decision at a certain point. This is the purpose of judicial review and 
additional control of the Supreme Court – to issue a judgement resulting from cassation 
appeal.  
Although the assessment made by the court is subject to verification, one cannot 
imply the impact on or a control over a judge. 
The idea of external control over the work of a judge is a kind of logical absurd. By definition, a 
judge is a trustworthy person that not need to be controlled. Multi-level court system does not 
contest the thesis. Juridical activity of judges is subject to judicial supervision – thus appeal trial. 
                                                          
73 Cf. Damasiewicz, Agnieszka. Metoda prawnika (o tym, czy sędzia-wioślarz i adwokat-chemik są 
lepszymi prawnikami?). Manuscript. 
74 Cf. Gonera, op. cit., p. 91. 
75 Ibidem, p. 94. 
76 Juwenalis, Satyry, VI, 347 (around. 115 A.D). 
77 Or: „and who will control the controllers.” 
78 Fuller, Lon Luvois. Anatomia prawa. Lublin, 1968, p. 18. 
79 Piasecki, Organizacja wymiaru…, op. cit., p. 61. 
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It is used to adjust judgements. The institution of appeal does not result from lack of 
fundamental trust to judges in general, but from the fact that no person is infallible and some 
people are dishonest. It also results from the recognition of the right to a two-instance 
proceedings granted to citizens by the Constitution and from a reason of more general nature – 
that is e.g. difficulties in determining the so-called objective truth or interpretation of provisions. 
The change of judgement or reversal of a judgement by the higher instance does not result from 
the fact that a judge in the lower instance has been bribed or negligent but is a consequence of a 
different interpretation of provisions or other conclusions reached by a judge of a higher instance 
court.80 
“Therefore, multi-level court system is not a supervising institution appointed in fear of 
judges’ dishonesty or unconscientiousness. Its essence is rather to support an extremely 
difficult idea that is putting law into force.”81 
An appeal trial, and in particular a control of the Supreme Court, could be 
compared to self-control of the cybernetic system. Given the independence of judges, 
they can be treated as “relatively closed system” within the meaning of cybernetics. 
Cybernetics covers inter alia information coupling in relatively closed systems.82 For 
example, when one lifts a glass that is on the table, one assumes that the hand, led by 
the eye, goes directly to the glass to lift it. Meanwhile, according to cybernetics, 
reaching for a glass is a process of eliminating deviations – deviations between the hand 
and the object are being reduced during the whole process, so that, at the end there so no 
mistake and a glass is being lifted.83 Information is constantly being corrected. The 
process of application of law is also the process of transforming data related to facts, 
norms, and gradual and continuous control of the proper direction – where the direction 
given by the court of the first instance is then corrected by the court of the second 
instance of the Supreme Court. In other words, the essential role of judicial control is to 
                                                          
80 Najda, Magdalena; Romer, Teresa. Etyka dla sędziów. Rozważania. Warszawa, 2007, p. 15 
(introduction). 
81 Ibidem, p. 25. 
82 Cf. Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetyka a społeczeństwo. Warszawa, 1961, p. 15–17, [as cited in] 
Wróblewski, Jerzy. Sądowe stosowanie prawa. Warszawa, 1972, p. 57. “The term ‘cybernetics’ was 
created on 1940s by a mathematician from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Norbert Weiner, as 
metaphorical usage of a Greek word kybernetikos that means “a controlling man.” The ancient Greeks 
developed the concept of controlling skills probably on the basis of their understanding of processes of 
steering and navigation on watercraft, and extended its application to diplomacy and running the country. 
Wiener used this (…) concept to describe the process of exchange of information, through which 
machines and organisms are characterized by self-control that allow them to sustain the state of stability.” 
Morgan, Gareth. Obrazy organizacji. Warszawa, 2009, p. 94. 
83 Cf. Morgan, op. cit., p. 95. 
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be an act of self-controlling system.84 It follows that the principle of independence and 
the instance control are not contradictory to each other.85 
How do judges themselves see the judicial control in the context of 
independence? They say: 
“There is no case which judgement I am not sure about. It does not mean that they are 
not changed, revoked sometimes, but each case is being profound thought by me.”86 
“Success? What matters is a good legal idea on a case. Even the revoked judgement 
may be a success.”87 
“In civil cases there are many appeals as there might be different assessments in the 
cases.”88 
“I postpone the publication. I do not allow myself to make a mistake hoping that appeal 
will correct the judgement.”89 
“Sometimes I announce the judgement and see in people a sense of resentment. One 
needs to face that. I do not know if it results from them being so sure about them being 
right or I have given credence to testimony of the party that have had a better 
representative. Or one party has been more foresighted and secured their interested at 
some stage, made documentation, and the other counted on a good will that was not 
there. Then I hope that they appeal and maybe the bench of three Justices, being more 
experienced, will find something. I still have doubts, maybe because I do not adjudicate 
for that long – as others say they do not have doubts anymore.”90 
“I am aware I do things that are important to people. Even if a proceeding seems to be 
funny or unimportant, people do not see it as such. If they do, they would not trouble 
themselves with going to court. I think I do something really special. And the feeling 
always accompanies me. And the high sense of responsibility. And, not wanting to be 
misunderstood, the feeling of ‘power’ – in big quotation marks. Not power to do 
                                                          
84 Habermas pointed that “Judicial control has the auto-reflective character that means the competence to 
control its own activities” – Cf. Habermas, Jürgen. Faktyczność i obowiązywanie. Warszawa, 2005,  
p. 259. 
85 Gonera, op. cit., p. 87. 
86 An interview No. 10, the Judge of Local Court. 
87 An Interview No. 1, the Judge of Regional Court. 
88 An Interview No. 2, the Judge of Regional Court. 
89 An interview No. 9, the Judge of Local Court. 
90 An interview No. 52, the Judge of Local Court. 
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whatever I want, but that I settle, make decisions. I do not feel the privilege of power, 
but the burden of it. Those are not things “from”-“to.” It is very important for me.”91 
“Assessment of effectiveness does not depend on the judge, but on the appeal instance, 
and then on the Supreme Court. And the judgements of the Supreme Court are furnished 
with critical remarks. Then one may ask – who has been effective. The court which 
sentence has been revoked? (And the court is bound in the case, and cannot say – there 
have been five opinions and each says I am right).”92 
 Which conclusion can be drawn from these statements? There is no doubt that 
judges do not take judicial control personally as the intervention in judicial work of a 
particular judge, but as a system tool for the correction of judgements. They do not treat 
the revoked judgement as a criticism of them as individuals or as an attack on their 
assessment, but as making possibly different, but also justifiable, assessment that they 
do not need to accept. This is due to the specific nature of civil cases where difference 
in assessments is a norm rather than exception. Sometimes judges have a sense of relief 
that the case would be re-assessed. However, they are not released from responsibility 
for the case, knowing that the judgement may not be appealed – so there may be no 
moment of correction of a judgement. They have a high sense of responsibility for the 
sentence.  
 
Following the jurisprudence 
 
 From the article 178 section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and 
article 60 of the Law on Common Courts Organisation results that a judge shall be 
independent and subject only to the Constitution, acts and conscience. Analysing the 
relations between independence of judges while adjudication and the stability of law, 
one might ask if judges shall also follow the jurisprudence. On the one hand, following 
the existing jurisprudence meets the condition of independence that includes the 
knowledge resulting from wide reading and studies (“freedom from ignorance,” 
“freedom to intellectual openness and inquisitiveness”). On the other hand, promotion 
of judges depends on, inter alia, the effectiveness of adjudication understood as 
upholding judgements in appeal trials. In literature it is noted that: 
                                                          
91 An Interview No. 64, the Judge of Local Court. 
92 An Interview No. 32, the Judge of Regional Court. 
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„…a result of the mechanism is the existence of specifically understood <common law 
– A.D>, the more doubtful as the current technology makes it possible to use the 
extensive jurisprudence of dubious quality being selected for different reasons.”93 
 I have explained earlier that judicial control cannot be and is not perceived as a 
pressure or influence jeopardizing the independence of a judge, as it is only the 
mechanism of self-controlling system. However, in case of constant revokes of a 
judgement, “the power of persuasion” seems to be more direct: 
“It happens that I do something constantly, but I cannot convince the court of appeal. So 
eventually I change the practice.”94 
However, we cannot demonize the “the power of persuasion”, because, as the 
same judge claims: 
“… and sometimes I come to the conclusion that the practice was wrong, even though 
judgements have been upheld.”95  
Besides, the situation in which a judge, while getting acquainted with the 
jurisprudence, changes its decision to the consistent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
can hardly be regarded as “impact.” 
One shall notice where the judgement being considered come from – the local 
court, the regional court, the appeal court, or the Supreme Court – as the roles of the 
courts are different. While the judgement of local, regional, or appeal court can be 
treated as inspiration, the judgements of the Supreme Courts shall be considered as a 
point of reference because of the special role of this court in the administration of 
justice i.e. ensuring of uniformity of jurisprudence.96  
Act of enforcement of law is characterized by not unified judicature in similar 
cases and it is the role of the Supreme Court to prevent the situation to the certain 
extent.  
                                                          
93 Czarnik, Zbigniew. Prawotwórcza rola sądu a dyskrecjonalność sędziowska. [in:] Dyskrecjonalna 
władza sędziego, zagadnienia teorii i praktyki, eds. Dębiński, Marcin; Pelewicz, Robert; Rakoczy, 
Tomasz. Tarnobrzeg, 2012,  
http://tarnobrzeg.so.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Dyskrecjonalna%20władza%20sędziego%2C%20Tarnobrze
g%202012_0.pdf . 
94 An Interview No. 5, the Judge of Regional Court. 
95 An Interview No. 5, the Judge of Regional Court. 
96 In case of a resolution with a judicial norm status it even has to be the point of reference.  
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“With all the freedom of choice that is given to a judge by statuses (…), a certain 
uniformity of jurisprudence is an indispensable condition of proper functioning of 
society and, hence, it represents at least an instrumental value, which, to some extent, 
can compensate for accidental decisions that fully comply with applicable law, but 
decisions which in the case we consider to be unjust."97 
In referring to jurisprudence one shall – as in the application of law in general – 
maintain a certain standard. In the context of application of law, the notion of standard 
is characterized by Ewa Łętkowska who claims that “a standard is a term that refers to a 
model of behaviour (…). Law consists of both principles and an established standard.”98 
She explains that “there might be a law that has a great potential, but, due to the 
repetitive, poorly shaped practice, the standard of protection granted by the law is much 
lower than the one presented by the principle.”99 Referring to jurisprudence also may be 
done with different – low or high – standards. “Jurisprudence shall be collected and 
analysed to determine the current standard to avoid quoting any, maybe even random, 
marginal, or obsolete judgement.”100 A judge indicates here the influence of technology 
on the decision making process: 
“Publication of judgements may be risky – how judges refer to them? Thought process 
may be superficial, one might just copy judgements. Portals with judgements may 
support different things: opportunism, laziness, or challenging one’s own way of 
thinking, without copying. (…). The Supreme Court is to unify law. A question of law – 
and no other judgement. Not a precedent – but positive law.”101 
I have asked judges whether they compare current cases with others, previously 
examined. When answering the question they referred both to their own experience and 
to the use of judicial decisions of other courts: 
“One needs to refer to jurisprudence as it is about the confidence of parties and 
representatives. Too bad if one judge decides one thing and the other – otherwise. For 
example, several people filed a lawsuit, obtained a favourable decision and the 
opponent’s appeal has been dismissed. The others, being in similar situation, followed 
                                                          
97 Ziembiński, O pojmowaniu…, op. cit., p. 128. 
98 Łętowska, op. cit., p. 12, 13. 
99 Ibidem, p. 12. 
100 Ibidem, p. 13. 
101 An interview No. 84, the Judge of Regional Court. 
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the example, and the local court reached the same decision but appeal court did not 
share the same position, so the second group of people was sent away empty-handed 
and needed to bear costs. The situation in which one court makes one decision and 
another, in the same circumstances, forms different judgement should not happen. That 
is why I try to follow the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, unless it is in opposition 
to my own sense of justice.”102 
“While I do not remember the details of the cases, I remember the general approach to 
them.”103 
“Once a decision is made, there is no time or will to re-examine it. The representative of 
the party needs to be really good to force a judge to reflect on the problem already being 
thought over by a judge.”104 
“One forgets the case being settled, but remembers the experience. Without re-
examining previous cases.”105 
“In case of legal status I compare cases. I remember the judgement – of the Supreme 
Court or my own. I remember which facts need to be noticed to apply them in a current 
case.106 
“I have my own files and ‘words of wisdom’.”107 
“I act like a scientist. I read judgements. Knowledge helps, gives clearance.”108 
„For example – where does an amount of compensation come from? There are some 
criteria established in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to be considered: first – 
the level of damage and permanence of health impairment, range of injuries, the level of 
physical and psychological suffering, length and intensity of the rehabilitation process, 
consequences of damage, changes in injured party’s life, former lifestyle, and age of a 
person. There are plenty of criteria that need to be taken into consideration. And I 
assume that compensation shall be of a sensible value, it cannot be just symbolic. In 
other words, if someone claims for compensation and the circumstances being 
                                                          
102 An Interview No. 4, the Judge of Local Court. 
103 An Interview No. 5, the Judge of Regional Court. 
104 An Interview No. 5, the Judge of Regional Court. 
105 An Interview No. 9, the Judge of Local Court. 
106 An Interview No. 10, the Judge of Local Court. 
107 An Interview No. 1, the Judge of Regional Court. 
108 An Interview No. 1, the Judge of Regional Court. 
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established give the ground to award compensation, I see no reason to moderate, reduce 
it, unless a person clearly has not suffered and just try to get rich. Here the role of the 
court of second instance is very limited as a regional court can change the amount of 
compensation only when it is significantly low or high. As a rule, it is a competence of a 
court of first instance to determine compensation.”109 
“One thinks: I would do it differently, and therefore I consider ruling favourably in an 
appeal. Sure, we encounter here the cases which we examined before the court of first 
instance. It somehow affects, it is our experience, it is our methodology of work. Being 
a judge in the court of second instance does not mean that I do not have opinions, or 
have not examined similar cases in the court of first instance. It is just the opposite. It is 
obvious to make references to that. (...) the fact that we are judges in courts of second 
instance (...) is a kind of continuation.”110 
 At the same time, the situation, in which a judge does not use jurisprudence 
because they have no time for studying it, debates from a good standard111: 
“I read all judgements, check if there is something new on a case, read comments – only 
if a case is serious or difficult. Those are isolated situations. If the problem is not serious 
– I usually have no time to reach to jurisprudence. I read the principle, see what it says 
and I make a decision according to that.”112 
The same judge adds: 
”…if a party refers to reasonable arguments and it makes sense, it is not possible for me 
not to read everything I can find on the subject. In addition, the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court is sometimes being questioned. There are different judgements on the 
same case. Fortunately, the Supreme Court gathers itself and adopts a summarising 
resolution.”113 
 Quoted statements proves that, firstly, judges see the point in following the 
jurisprudence, especially the one of the Supreme Court, however – only to the certain 
extent, determined by their personal conviction. Secondly, they remember not the 
                                                          
109 An interview No. 85, the Judge of Regional Court. 
110 An Interview No. 85, the Judge of Regional Court. 
111 An amount of work for a judge, both resulting from amount of cases and amount of administrative 
work on the case causes the standard being lowered. Judges point out in the interviews that they would 
like to and feel that should devote more time for a case. However, due to the amount of cases and tasks, it 
is impossible.  
112 An Interview No. 4, the Judge of Local Court. 
113 An Interview No. 4, the Judge of Local Court. 
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particular cases, but their approach to the specific legal matter. They admit that it is 
difficult to change the approach without convincing argumentation presented by a party. 
At the same time, they are aware that the usage of a particular solution depends the facts 
of the case.  
 The attitude of judges to jurisprudence of other courts may be described with the 
words of painters and their attitude toward painting of other painters. When it comes to 
following jurisprudence of other courts as inspiration – I quote the words of Henry 
Matisse: “I owe my art to all painters.”114 When talking about appreciation of the 
jurisprudence of other judges, while maintaining someone’s individual characteristics, 
one may quote Matisse again: “If I were not making the paintings I make, I would paint 
like Picasso.”115 But when it comes to the critical approach in an elegant but significant 
form – I use the words of Picasso criticizing Braque’s paintings in an exhibition: “Well 
hung.”116 
 In conclusion, one cannot state that a judge shall be “loyal” to jurisprudence. 
However, it should be noted that a judge shall establish such a standard of using the 





 The author’s role was to examine the relationship between the stability of law 
manifested in the form of uniformity of jurisprudence and internal independence of a 
judge.  
 Firstly, after determining the relations between “certainty,” “consistency,” and 
“uniformity,” I analysed three problems: the role of assessment in judge’s judgements, 
the need of making assessments caused by openness of natural language which 
principles are formulated in, and modern understanding of separation of powers in the 
context of the judiciary. There reflections let me outline the framework for the analysis 
of the fundamental issue which is the relation between independence of judges and 
stability of jurisprudence.  
                                                          
114 Matiss, Pędzlem..., op. cit., Quote No. 212. 
115 Ibidem, Quote No. 243. 
116 Pablo Picasso while “judging” Braque’s paintings, Pędzlem…, op. cit., Quote No. 40. 
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 Then I reviewed the essential mechanisms of ensuring the uniformity of 
jurisprudence choosing for analysis those that are established to remove discrepancies in 
assessments. I passed over those designed to improve the obvious mistakes.  
 As, according to my first hypothesis, the notion of independence of a judge is a 
complex one because it consist of internal and external independence, I analysed 
internal independence that is more subtle to recognise and more difficult to examine, as 
it is protected mostly by internal boundaries resulting from a personality and education 
of a judge. 
 As, according to my second hypothesis, internal independence of a judge can be 
viewed as “independence from” and “freedom to,” I defined the two aspects of 
independence. Freedom “from” means the independence from pressure and influences, 
from voluntarism and arbitrariness, from emotions and ignorance. Freedom “to” means 
primarily the freedom to intellectual openness, manifested on various ways. The 
analysis of the “freedoms” was crucial for the third hypothesis, according to which 
internal independence of judges influences their decision on factors to consider while 
adjudicating, and thus, determines a role of a judge in the process of creating the 
stability of law.  
According to my fourth hypothesis, the judicature is a self-controlling system. 
Internal independence of judges is one of the factors legitimizing the self-control of the 
system. When examining this matter, I analysed the problem on boarders between 
independence and control, illustrating it with a famous question: “And who will guard 
the guardians?” Here the dilemma is that, on the one hand, instruments designed to 
avoid mistakes or differences in assessments shall exist, and, on the other hand, there 
need to be a stage where a judge shall stop to be controlled and be allow to make the 
final assessment. I referred to the cybernetic interpretation of a problem of eliminating 
mistakes by adjusting actions to the established goal, pointing out that judicial control is 
an element of self-controlling system and cannot be treated as intervention to 
jurisprudence of judges. I also considered the extent to which judges shall be “loyal” to 
jurisprudence – their own ones or of other courts, especially the Supreme Court. 
Analysing words of judges stated in the interviews conducted, I came to the conclusion 
that following the jurisprudence is perceived by judged as a value related to stability and 
predictability of the judicature – but to the limit. I pointed out to the problem of treating 
judgements as a set of ready-to-use decisions. The problem is indicated by judges 
themselves. They fear to create a negative standard of using jurisprudence. “A standard” 
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becomes an essential concept that shall be understood as a set of behavioural models 
which, in addition to legislation, shape the judiciary.  
To summarise, the internal independence of a judge, against all appearances, 
does not interfere with the postulate of the uniformity of law, with it being a part of the 
more general concept of stability of law. On the contrary, reasonably used internal 
independence of a judge influences the axiological consistency of jurisprudence, which 
should be reflected in its uniformity, and, consequently, in the stability of law.  
 
